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Can a Representative-Agent Model
Represent a Heterogeneous-Agent Economy?
By Sungbae An, Yongsung Chang and Sun-Bin Kim∗
Abstract
Accounting for observed fluctuations in aggregate employment, consumption, and
real wage using the optimality conditions of a representative household requires
preferences that are incompatible with economic priors. In order to reconcile the-
ory with data, we construct a model with heterogeneous agents whose decisions
are difficult to aggregate because of incomplete capital markets and the indivisi-
ble nature of labor supply. If we were to explain the model-generated aggregate
time series using decisions of a stand-in household, such a household must have
a non-concave or unstable utility as is often found with the aggregate U.S. data.
(JEL: E24, E32, J21, J22)
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Modern business cycle theories posit that observed aggregate fluctuations in the U.S. econ-
omy correspond to optimal decisions of a stand-in household (e.g., Finn E. Kydland and
Edward C. Prescott, 1982, and Robert G. King, Charles I. Plosser, and Sergio T. Rebelo,
1988). In these models, the cyclical variation of aggregate consumption and employment is
a result of the continuous optimum of a household that trades current and future goods and
leisure in response to stochastic movements in prices. However, studies hat use aggregate
time-series data to test the hypothesis of intertemporal substitution often reach negative
conclusions. For example, Gregory N. Mankiw, Julio J. Rotemberg, and Lawrence H. Sum-
mers (1985) (denoted MRS hereafter) found that the over-identifying restrictions implied by
the theory are almost always rejected, the estimated parameters of preferences are highly
unstable, and the utility function is often non-concave, leading to elasticities of wrong signs.
This incompatibility between the representative-agent model and the aggregate data is often
viewed as a failure of labor-market clearing, (e.g., Gal´ı, Jordi, Mark Gertler, and David
Lope´z-Salido, 2007).
In this paper we argue that such a conclusion is premature. We demonstrate that an
attempt to account for the aggregate behavior of a heterogeneous-agent economy by a “ficti-
tious” representative household often fails. We construct a model economy where all prices
are flexible and all markets clear at all times. In our model, individual households possess
identical preferences but face a limit on the amount they can borrow and cannot perfectly
insure against idiosyncratic productivity shocks (S. Rao Aiyagari, 1994). Moreover, house-
holds supply their labor in an indivisible manner (Richard Rogerson, 1988). Under this
environment, the optimality condition for the choice of hours worked and consumption holds
with inequality due to a discrete choice of labor supply. Those inequalities are carried over
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to the aggregate level, preventing a nice aggregation of individual optimality conditions.
The lack of systematic movement among consumption, hours worked, and productivity
in the aggregate data has also resulted in the measurement of a considerable stochastic
wedge between the representative-agent model and the aggregate data; see, e.g., Robert E.
Hall (1997) and V.V. Chari, Patrick Kehoe, and Ellen MacGrattan (2007). Time-varying
factors in the marginal rate of substitution between commodity consumption and leisure (e.g.,
stochastic shifts in preferences, home production technology, or changes in labor-income tax
rates) are proposed to account for this wedge. Our analysis also suggests that such a wedge
may reflect imperfect aggregation rather than fundamental changes in preferences.1
The equilibrium path of our model economy under the exogenous aggregate productivity
shocks reproduces the volatility and correlation structure of key aggregate variables (con-
sumption, hours, and wages) from the U.S. economy. We then ask whether outcomes of
our heterogeneous-agent model economy are readily characterized as realizations of an opti-
mizing representative agent. We estimate three optimality conditions that a representative
agent would face when choosing hours worked and commodity consumption. If we were to
explain the model-generated aggregate time series using decisions of a stand-in household,
such a household must have a highly unstable or non-concave utility: the estimated repre-
sentative household often works longer hours and consumes more commodities when the real
wage is low. Similar to the finding by MRS from the actual U.S. aggregate data, the gen-
eralized method of moments (GMM) estimates of preference parameters of a representative
household are highly unstable or often have wrong signs.
To investigate the marginal contributions of each friction (capital market incomplete-
1Our result is consistent with that of Jose A. Scheinkman and Laurence Weiss (1986), who showed that
capital-market incompleteness can lead to a stochastic term in aggregate preferences.
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ness and indivisibility of labor), we consider additional model economies that feature each
friction only: the incomplete capital markets with divisible labor economy (referred to as
“incomplete-markets” model) and the complete capital markets with indivisible labor econ-
omy (referred to as “indivisible-labor” model). According to the GMM estimation of model-
generated aggregate time series, we find these economies can be well represented by optimal
choices of a representative agent. In the “incomplete-markets” model (with divisible labor),
the GMM estimates based on model-generated aggregate time series fairly accurately reveal
the individual households’ preference parameters. We show that the aggregation error in
the optimality condition for the choice of consumption and hours worked reflects the ratio
of the (CES) aggregate of the marginal utility of individual consumption to the marginal
utility of aggregate consumption. While this ratio is, in principle, time-varying, its variation
is quantitatively small because all households’ consumptions as well as hours tend to move
together in response to aggregate productivity shocks (everyone is working). This type of
approximate aggregation is not possible when the labor supply is indivisible. The individual
optimality condition holds with inequality due to a discrete choice of labor supply and such
inequality persists at the aggregate level.2 However, when capital markets are complete,
despite an indivisible labor supply, the equilibrium of a heterogeneous-agent economy can be
well described by an efficient allocation based on comparative advantage. In other words, the
GMM estimates reveal the social planner’s objective function, the equally weighted average
of household utility functions.
Confronted with the inability of an equilibrium model to account for the joint behavior
2The difficulty in aggregating individual optimality conditions is distinctly different from the “bounded
rationality” (often refereed to as approximate aggregation) pioneered by Per Krusell and Anthony A. Smith
(1998). We discuss this with more details in Section III.D.
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of aggregate consumption, hours worked, and wages, MRS proposed three hypotheses: (1)
aggregation error, (2) economy-wide time-varying preferences, and (3) failure of market
clearing.3 While it is highly plausible that all of these have contributed to the discrepancy
between the representative-agent model and the aggregate data, our analysis suggests that
the incompatibility between the representative household’s optimization and the aggregate
data may reflect a poor aggregation — which results in a stochastic wedge in the aggregate
condition — rather than a failure of market clearing or exogenous shifts in preferences. When
the model economy consists of heterogeneous agents and the individual optimality conditions
are hard to aggregate, an attempt to account for the aggregate time series by an optimizing
behavior of the representative household fails. The relative risk aversion of consumption is
significantly underestimated when the aggregate consumption Euler equation is used. The
parameter that governs the behavior of the labor supply is estimated with great uncertainty,
just like those from the actual aggregate data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly discusses the GMM estimate of three
optimality conditions based on the aggregate U.S. time series. In Section II we compute the
equilibrium fluctuations of the heterogeneous-agent economy with incomplete capital markets
and indivisible labor using the bounded rationality method developed by Krusell and Smith
(1998). In Section III, based on the aggregate time series generated from the heterogeneous-
agent model economy, we estimate three optimality conditions that a “fictitious” represen-
tative agent would satisfy. We also provide an example that illustrates the difficulty in
3It is also well-known that low-wage and less-skilled workers enter the labor market during expansions
and exit during recessions, making aggregate hours more volatile than the effective unit of hours (Gary
D. Hansen, 1993), and making aggregate wages less volatile than individual wages (Mark Bils, 1985, Gary
Solon, Robert Barsky, and Jonathan A. Parker, 1994). However, this so-called compositional bias has an
impact mostly on the volatilities, not on the correlations. Both in the model and in the data, the poor
GMM estimates of preference parameters stem mostly from the lack of correlation between employment and
productivity (wage), which is 0.03 (0.2).
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aggregating individual optimality conditions when both frictions are present. Section IV
presents a summary.
I. GMM Estimates Based on Aggregate Data from
the U.S. Economy
Consider a representative household whose preferences are given by:
max Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
C1−σt+s − 1
1− σ − ψ
H1+γt+s
1 + γ
}
where Ct is consumption and Ht is hours worked in period t.
4 The preference parameters
are β, the discount factor, σ, the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity of
consumption, γ, the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity of hours, and a
constant ψ. When the representative household follows the optimal path, three first-order
conditions must hold:
ψ
Hγt
C−σt
Pt
Wt
− 1 = 0.(S)
Et
[
β
C−σt+1
C−σt
Pt(1 +Rt)
Pt+1
− 1
]
= 0.(EC)
Et
[
β
Hγt+1
Hγt
Wt(1 +Rt)
Wt+1
− 1
]
= 0.(EL)
Here Pt is the nominal price of a unit of Ct, Wt is the wage rate, and Rt is the nominal
return from holding a security between t and t + 1. The static first-order condition (S)
holds regardless of the household’s decisions in the capital market. The Euler equation for
4We assume a utility function separable between consumption and hours worked, which is popular in
both business cycle analysis and the empirical labor supply literature. However, non-separability does not
change the main result of the article.
6
consumption (EC) will hold even if labor supply cannot be freely chosen, and trading is not
possible in many assets, as long as some asset exists that is either held in positive amounts
or for which borrowing is possible. The Euler equation for leisure (EL) asserts that along an
optimal path the representative household cannot improve its welfare by working one hour
more at t and using its earnings Wt to purchase a security whose proceeds will be used to
buy back Wt(1 +Rt)/Wt+1 of leisure at t+ 1 in all states of nature.
If the static first-order condition (S) held exactly, one of (EC) and (EL) would be re-
dundant. However, since (S) is unlikely to hold exactly in the data, we use the information
in all three of these first-order conditions to estimate the parameters of the utility func-
tion. Following MRS, σ, γ, β and ψ are estimated by the GMM using the quarterly U.S.
aggregate time series for the period 1964:I-2003:IV. Aggregate real per capita consumption
is the sum of consumption expenditures on non-durable goods and services. The aggregate
price is the price deflator that corresponds to our measure of consumption. Aggregate hours
worked represent the total hours employed in the non-agricultural business sector. The nom-
inal wage is the nominal hourly earnings of production and non-supervisory workers in the
non-agricultural sector. The nominal interest rate is the 3-month Treasury bill rate. All
quantities are divided by the working-age (ages between 16 and 65) population.
We use two sets of instruments in the GMM estimation. Instrument I consists of the
following variables for periods t−1 and t−2: growth rates of consumption, real interest rates,
hours worked, and real wages. Instrument II consists of the same variables as Instrument
I but for periods t and t − 1. Hence, we can check through Instrument II if the estimates
are severely affected when current variables are used as instrument variables. While it is
common to include period t variables as instruments in the asset pricing literature (see Lars
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P. Hansen, 2008; John H. Cochrane, 2001, Chapter 10, for a detailed explanation of the
GMM procedure), the existence of predetermined prices (such as sticky wages) may warrant
excluding the period t-variable from the list of instruments (see MRS for this argument).
We report the estimates using both instruments, and they are not very different from each
other. The standard two-stage approach as in Lars P. Hansen and Kenneth J. Singleton
(1982) is used in performing the GMM estimation. At the first stage, the identity weighting
matrix is applied to get preliminary estimates of the coefficients. The inverse of Whitney
K. Newey and Kenneth D. West’s (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
(HAC) covarince matrix is used as the second-stage weighting matrix to derive asymptotically
efficient estimates.5
Estimates in Table 1 basically replicate those in MRS. They also share the common
shortcomings of preference parameter estimates in aggregate time series such as in the studies
by Kenneth B. Dunn and Kenneth J. Singleton (1986), Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1984),
and Eric Ghysels and Alastair Hall (1990). According to these estimates, preferences are
often found to be unreasonable. In the static first-order condition (S), the households are
not risk averse enough. The estimate of σ is 0.210 (with standard error of 0.062) and 0.188
(0.067) with Instruments I and II, respectively. The marginal disutility from working is not
increasing in hours worked, since the estimate of γ is negative: it is -0.569 (0.198) and -0.473
(0.210), with Instruments I and II, respectively. According to these estimates, households
would often work longer hours when the real wage is low (i.e., consume less leisure despite
the low real price of leisure).
In the Euler equation for consumption (EC), the intertemporal substitution elasticity of
5The HAC covariance matrix is calculated with a Bartlett kernel and Newey and West’s (1987) fixed
bandwidth selection criterion.
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consumption turns to a negative value (-0.210 and -0.129, respectively, with Instruments I
and II), although it is not statistically significant. In the Euler equation for leisure (EL),
the estimate for γ is 0.179 and 0.089, respectively, with Instruments I and II, implying a
fairly elastic labor supply. One of the stylized facts in aggregate labor-market fluctuations
is that hours worked vary greatly without a corresponding movement of wages. To account
for these, the representative household must have had a very elastic labor-supply schedule.
According to these point estimates, the implied value for the intertemporal substitution
elasticity of hours worked (1/γ) is 5.6 and 11.2. These are clearly beyond the admissible
values based on empirical micro studies such as those of Thomas E. McCurdy (1981) and
Josheph G. Altonji (1986). When all three optimality conditions are estimated together as
a system of equations in the last column of the table, σ is -0.046 (with standard error of
0.027) and γ is 0.023 (0.044), according to which the representative household exhibits a
non-concave utility in consumption and is willing to shift its work schedule even for a tiny
movement in anticipated wage changes. Each optimality condition is rejected according to
Hansen’s (1982) J-test of over-identifying restrictions at the significance level of 5%. When
the three optimality conditions are tested together, the intertemporal substitution hypothesis
is not rejected at the significance level of 10%. When expenditures on non-durable goods
(excluding services) are used for aggregate consumption, the estimation result moves slightly
toward our economic priors. The estimate of σ in Table 2 is now between 0.136 (0.333) and
0.843 (0.049), depending on the optimality condition and instrument. However, the estimate
of γ is still highly unstable (either negative or a small value), since it ranges between -0.450
(0.115) and 0.413 (0.138).
In sum, two features in the aggregate labor-market data led to the wrong sign or a small
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value of γ. A lack of systematic correlation between the cyclical components of hours worked
and wages (which is 0.39 in the aggregate data after Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering) results
in either non-concave or unstable utility. Accounting for the volatility of hours worked
relative to wages (more precisely, relative to the real wage evaluated by the marginal utility
of consumption) requires an elastic labor-supply schedule. (At business cycle frequencies,
the ratio of the standard deviation of hours to that of wages is 1.52). The discrepancy
between the optimality conditions and aggregate data is often interpreted as evidence of
the failure of labor market clearing due to, say, sticky wages. In the next section, we show
that a competitive equilibrium obtained from a reasonably calibrated heterogeneous-agent
model can lead to estimates similar to those we see in the U.S data, which in turn implies
that non-sensible estimates of preference parameters in the aggregate data do not necessarily
reflect a failure of market clearing or stochastic components of preferences. Rather, they can
reflect imperfect aggregation of individual optimality conditions.
II. The Benchmark Model
The model economy is based on Yongsung Chang and Sun-Bin Kim (2007) who extend
Krusell and Smith’s (1998) heterogeneous-agent model with incomplete capital markets (Aiyagari,
1994) to a model with an indivisible labor supply (Rogerson, 1988). Both frictions break
the tight link between individual and aggregate labor-supply schedules. The indivisibility
of labor implies that the optimality condition for hours worked holds as inequality at the
individual level. The incompleteness of capital markets implies an imperfect aggregation of
individual optimality conditions.
There is a continuum (measure one) of workers who have identical preferences but dif-
10
ferent productivity. Individual productivity varies exogenously according to a stochastic
process with a transition probability distribution function pix(x
′|x) = Pr(xt+1 ≤ x′|xt = x).
A worker maximizes his utility by choosing consumption ct and hours worked ht:
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
c1−σt − 1
1− σ − ψ
h1+γt
1 + γ
}
subject to
at+1 = wtxtht + (1 + rt)at − ct.
Workers trade claims for physical capital, at, which yields the rate of return rt and depreciates
at rate δ each period. They face a borrowing constraint: at ≥ a¯ for all t. Workers supply
their labor in an indivisible manner; i.e., ht takes either zero or h¯(< 1). If he works, a
worker supplies h¯ units of labor and earns wtxth¯, where wt is the wage rate per effective unit
of labor. The representative firm produces output according to a constant-returns-to-scale
Cobb-Douglas technology in capital, Kt, and efficiency units of labor, Lt.
Yt = F (Lt, Kt, λt) = λtL
α
tK
1−α
t ,
where λt is the aggregate productivity shock with a transition probability distribution func-
tion piλ(λ
′|λ) = Pr(λt+1 ≤ λ′|λt = λ). In this model economy, a technology shock is the only
aggregate shock. This does not necessarily reflect our view on the source of business cycles.
Since we would like to estimate aggregate preferences, we intentionally rule out shocks that
may shift the labor-supply schedule itself and cause identification problems in estimating
preferences (e.g., exogenous shifts in aggregate preferences, government spending, or the
income tax rate).
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The value function for an employed worker, denoted by V E, is:
V E(a, x;λ, µ) = max
a′∈A
{
c1−σ − 1
1− σ − ψ
h¯1+γ
1 + γ
+ βE
[
max
{
V E(a′, x′;λ′, µ′), V N(a′, x′;λ′, µ′)
}∣∣x, λ]}
subject to
c = wxh¯+ (1 + r)a− a′,
a′ ≥ a¯,
µ′ = T(λ, µ),
where T denotes a transition operator that defines the law of motion for the distribution of
workers µ(a, x).6 The value function for a non-employed worker, denoted by V N(a, x;λ, µ),
is defined similarly with h = 0. Then, the labor-supply decision is characterized by:
V (a, x;λ, µ) = max
h∈{0,h¯}
{
V E(a, x;λ, µ), V N(a, x;λ, µ)
}
.
The competitive equilibrium consists of a set of value functions, {V E(a, x;λ, µ), V N(a, x;λ, µ),
V (a, x;λ, µ)}, a set of decision rules for consumption, asset holdings, and labor supply,
{c(a, x;λ, µ), a′(a, x;λ, µ), h(a, x;λ, µ)}, aggregate capital and labor inputs, {K(λ, µ), L(λ, µ)},
factor prices, {w(λ, µ), r(λ, µ)}, and a law of motion for the distribution µ′ = T(λ, µ) such
that:
1. Individuals optimize:
Given w(λ, µ) and r(λ, µ), the individual decision rules c(a, x;λ, µ), a′(a, x;λ, µ), and
h(a, x;λ, µ) solve V E(a, x;λ, µ), V N(a, x;λ, µ), and V (a, x;λ, µ).
6Let A and X denote sets of all possible realizations of a and x, respectively. The measure µ(a, x) is
defined over a σ-algebra of A×X .
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2. The representative firm maximizes profits:
w(λ, µ) = F1
(
L(λ, µ), K(λ, µ), λ
)
r(λ, µ) = F2
(
L(λ, µ), K(λ, µ), λ
)− δ
for all (λ, µ).
3. The goods market clears:
∫ {
a′(a, x;λ, µ) + c(a, x;λ, µ)
}
dµ = F
(
L(λ, µ), K(λ, µ), λ
)
+ (1− δ)K
for all (λ, µ).
4. Factor markets clear:
L(λ, µ) =
∫
xh(a, x;λ, µ)dµ
K(λ, µ) =
∫
adµ
for all (λ, µ).
5. Individual and aggregate behaviors are consistent:
µ′(A0, X0) =
∫
A0,X0
{∫
A,X
1a′=a′(a,x;λ,µ) dpix(x
′|x)dµ
}
da′dx′
for all A0 ⊂ A and X0 ⊂ X .
A. Calibration
We briefly explain the choice of the model parameters. The unit of time is a business quarter.
We assume that individual productivity x follows an AR(1) process: ln x′ = ρx lnx+εx, where
εx ∼ N(0, σ2x). We choose the values for ρx and σx by estimating AR(1) process of wages
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from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 1979-1992. We control for time effects
by annual dummies and individual fixed effects by sex, age, schooling, age2, schooling2, and
age × schooling. We then convert the annual estimates to quarterly values. The quarterly
values we obtain are ρx = 0.939 and σx = 0.287.
7 A working individual spends one-third of
his discretionary time (h¯ = 1/3). The intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption
is one (σ = 1). The intertemporal substitution elasticity of hours worked is 0.4 (γ = 2.5).
We set the borrowing constraint (a¯) to be -2. For an average productivity worker in our
model, this value corresponds to one half of his annual earnings, which matches up roughly
with the measures of credit limits reported in the survey data.8
We search for ψ such that the steady state employment rate is 60%. The discount factor
β is chosen so that the quarterly rate of return to capital is 1% in the steady state. An
aggregate productivity shock, λt, follows an AR(1) process: lnλ
′ = ρλ lnλ + ελ, where
ελ ∼ N(0, σ2λ). We set ρλ = 0.95 and σλ = 0.007. Table 3 summarizes the parameter values
of the benchmark economy.
B. Cross-sectional Distribution and Aggregate Fluctuations of
the Model
As we investigate the aggregation and its implication to economic fluctuations, it is desirable
for the model economy to possess a reasonable amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity and
business-cycle volatility. We compare cross-sectional earnings and wealth—two important
observable dimensions of heterogeneity in the labor market—found in the model and in the
7We use James J. Heckman (1979)’s maximum-likelihood estimation procedure, correcting for a sample se-
lection bias because productivities (wages) of workers who did not work are not reported. See Chang and Kim
(2006, 2007) for details.
8For example, according to Borghan M. Narajabad (2008), based on the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance
data, the mean credit limit of U.S. households is $15,223 measured in 1989 dollars.
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data. We also argue that the model-generated aggregate consumption, hours, and wages
(variables used in the GMM estimation) exhibit business cycle properties similar to those in
the data.
Table 4 summarizes both the PSID and the model’s detailed information on wealth and
earnings. The PSID denotes households’ family wealth distribution in 1983 (1984 survey).9
For each quintile group of wealth distribution, we calculate the wealth share, ratio of group
average to economy-wide average, and the earnings share.
In both the data and the model, the poorest 20 percent of families in terms of wealth
distribution were in debt. The PSID found that households in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th
quintiles own 0.50, 5.06, 18.74, 76.22 percent of total wealth, respectively, while, according
to the model, they own 2.46, 10.22, 23.88, 65.49 percent, respectively. The average wealth of
those in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles is, respectively, 0.03, 0.25, 0.93, and 3.81 times
larger than that of a typical household, according to the PSID. These ratios are 0.12, 0.51,
1.19, and 3.27, according to our model. Households in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles of
wealth distribution earn, respectively, 11.31, 18.72, 24.21, and 38.23 percent of total earnings,
according to the PSID. The corresponding groups earn 15.06, 19.01, 23.59, and 32.63 percent,
respectively, in the model. We argue that the model economy possesses a reasonable degree
of heterogeneity, thus making it possible to study the effects of cross-sectional aggregation.
To obtain the aggregate fluctuations, we solve the equilibrium of the model using the
“bounded rationality” method developed by Krusell and Smith (1998)—agents make use
of a finite set of moments of µ in forecasting aggregate prices. As in Krusell and Smith
(1998) we achieve a fairly precise forecast when we use the first moment of µ only (i.e.,
9Family wealth in the PSID reflects the net worth of houses, other real estate, vehicles, farms and
businesses owned, stocks, bonds, cash accounts, and other assets.
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aggregate capital, K). The detailed description of our computation procedure is given in
Chang and Kim (2007). Table 5 compares the cyclical property of key aggregate variables
of the model economy to that in the U.S. aggregate data for 1964:I - 2003:IV. All variables
are logged and de-trended by the HP filter. Our model with an aggregate productivity shock
generates about 63% of business cycle volatility in the data: the standard deviation of output
in the U.S. data is 2.04% and in our model it is 1.28%. This is not surprising because we
allow only for aggregate productivity shocks. The relative (to output) volatilities of aggregate
variables such as consumption, hours of work, and real wages are, however, pretty close to
those in the data. They are, respectively, 0.43, 0.85, and 0.56, in the data, whereas they
are 0.39, 0.76, and 0.50 in our model. The correlations with output are 0.83, 0.87, and 0.60,
respectively, for consumption, hours, and real wages in the data. They are, respectively, 0.84,
0.87, and 0.68 in the model. One distinguishing aspect of the model is that hours worked
is as volatile as that in the data but not highly correlated with wages (0.23 in our model
and 0.39 in the data) – despite the fact that the only driving force in the simulation is the
aggregate productivity shock. This is a striking result because the failure to generate a low
correlation between hours and wages is known to be one of the most salient shortcomings
of the RBC models. As we demonstrate below, the interaction between the indivisibility of
labor and capital market incompleteness breaks a tight link between employment and wages
at the aggregate level. In sum, our model reasonably well reproduces the business-cycle
properties of aggregate variables used in the GMM estimation.
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III. Estimation Based on the Model-Generated
Aggregate Data
A. Representative-Agent Model
In order to confirm that the GMM procedure recovers the true underlying preference pa-
rameters, we first estimate optimality conditions using the time series generated from the
representative-agent model with productivity shocks (i.e., the standard real business cycle
model). We assume that the preference parameters of the stand-in household are the same
as those in the benchmark economy: σ = 1 and γ = 2.5. All parameters except for ψ are
also identical to those in the benchmark model. We choose ψ so that the steady state hours
worked is one-third. We estimate the optimality conditions based on the sample size of 160
observations, close to that in the U.S. quarterly time series data. We do not estimate the
static first-order condition (S) because it holds exactly. The top panel of Table 6 reports
the average and standard deviation of the estimates using the 2484 sets of estimations, each
sample with 160 observations, three-fourths of which overlap with the next set. (We simulate
100,000 observations from the model and discard the first 500 observations.) We report the
estimates based on Instrument I only because they are not greatly affected by the choice of
instrument. According to the Euler equation for consumption (EC), the point estimate of
σ is 0.670 (with standard error 0.197). According to the Euler equation for leisure (EL),
the estimate of γ is 3.227 (0.252). When both equations are estimated jointly (System), σ
is 0.754 (0.198) and γ is 3.019 (0.239). While the estimate for β is always 0.99 with high
precision, the estimates of σ are smaller than the true value of 1 and those of γ are bigger
than its true value of 2.5.
This small sample bias becomes negligible when we quadruple the sample size. The
17
estimates in the bottom panel of Table 6 are based on 618 sets of estimation, each of which has
a sample size of 640 observations, three-fourths of which overlap with the next set. According
to these estimates, σ is 0.929 (with standard error of 0.093) and 1.008 (0.070), respectively,
in (EC) and (System). The estimate of γ is 2.800 (0.197) and 2.651 (0.137) in (EL) and
(System), respectively. Figure 1 exhibits the distribution (kernel density) of estimates for σ,
γ, β, and J-statistic from both small-sample-size (solid line) and large-sample-size (dashed
line) data sets generated from the model.10 Both σ and γ are now highly concentrated around
their true values, confirming that the GMM estimation accurately recovers true parameters
with a large enough sample size.
B. Heterogeneous-Agent model
We now apply the same GMM procedure to the aggregate time series generated from our
benchmark heterogeneous-agent model. According to Table 7, the estimate for σ based on
the small sample size (160 observations in each estimation) is 1.116 (0.079) and 1.107 (0.064)
in (S) and (System), respectively. The estimation based on the large sample size (640 obser-
vations in each estimation) delivers similar values. While the estimate for the intertemporal
substitution elasticity of consumption is close to the assumed value for individual house-
holds, when (EC) is estimated alone, the estimate of σ is below that of households. It is
only 0.422 (0.220) and 0.639 (0.127), respectively, for small and large sample sizes, which
resemble the low value of risk aversion often reported in the literature based on the aggregate
consumption Euler equation (e.g., Hansen and Singleton, 1984; Ghysels and Hall, 1990).
The estimation result of the intertemporal substitution elasticity of hours worked is strik-
10In estimating the kernel density, we used a Gaussian kernel with Bernard W. Silverman’s (1986) auto-
matic bandwidth selection criterion is used.
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ing. As we found from the actual U.S. data (e.g., Table 1, Table 2, or MRS), γ is estimated
to be either negative or close to zero (although statistically insignificant). According to the
small-sample-size estimation, the estimate of γ is −0.065(0.160), −0.158 (0.143) and 0.002
(0.101), respectively, in (S), (EL), and (System). This pattern persists in the large-sample-
size estimation. They are all negative values and occasionally statistically significant: -0.139
(0.075), -0.235 (0.064) and -0.013 (0.051), respectively, in (S), (EL) and (System). We noted
earlier that U.S. aggregate data led to the wrong sign or small value of γ for two reasons: (i) a
lack of systematic correlation between hours worked and wages results in either non-concave
or unstable utility, and (ii) accounting for the volatility of hours worked relative to wages
requires an elastic labor-supply schedule. Our heterogeneous-agent model also shows similar
patterns of relative volatility and correlation in aggregate employment and wages and has
led to similar GMM estimates of γ.
Figure 2 exhibits the kernel density of estimates based on both small-sample-size (solid
line) and large-sample-size (dashed line) data sets. The estimates for σ are clustered between
1 and 1.5 in both (S) and (System) among small-sample-size estimates and a similar pattern
persists in the estimates based on the large sample size, while the estimates are more clustered
as the sample size increases. Interestingly, estimates based on (EC) exhibit a somewhat
bimodal distribution at 0 and 0.5 among small-sample estimates. With a large sample size
the estimates are clustered around 0.64. Estimates of γ exhibit either a wrong sign or a
small positive number regardless of the sample size. They are distributed between -0.5 and
0.5, with more concentration among the large-sample-size estimates. In terms of the J-
statistic (bottom row), the hypothesis that a “representative” household optimally chooses
hours worked and consumption is often rejected, similar to the pattern we observe from the
19
GMM estimation based on actual U.S. data. In particular, with a large sample size, the
intertemporal substitution hypothesis is rejected at the frequency of 98 out of 100.
When the model economy consists of heterogeneous agents and the individual optimality
conditions are hard to aggregate, an attempt to account for the aggregate time series by
an optimizing behavior of the representative household fails. The relative risk aversion of
consumption is significantly underestimated when the aggregate consumption Euler equation
is used. The parameter that governs the behavior of the labor supply is estimated with
great uncertainty regardless of the equation and instrument, just like those from the actual
aggregate data.
C. Auxiliary Model Economies
In our benchmark model economy with heterogeneous agents the difficulty of aggregation
stems from two frictions: incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor. To distinguish the
contribution of each, we consider two additional model economies that feature each friction
only: the “incomplete-markets” model with divisible labor and the “indivisible-labor” model
with complete capital markets.
“incomplete-markets” model Households can choose any length of working hours but
still face the borrowing constraint and (uninsurable) idiosyncratic productivity shocks. This
is essentially the same specification as in Krusell and Smith (1998) with endogenous choice
of leisure. The equilibrium of this economy can be defined similar to that of the benchmark
model with the worker’s value function with divisible labor, V D(a, x;λ, µ):
V D(a, x;λ, µ) = max
a′∈A,h∈(0,1)
{
ln c−B h
1+γ
1 + γ
+ βE
[
V D(a′, x′;λ′, µ′)
∣∣x, λ]}
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subject to
c = w(λ, µ)xh+ (1 + r(λ, µ))a− a′,
a′ ≥ a¯,
µ′ = T(λ, µ).
“Indivisible-labor” model The next model economy we consider allows for complete
capital markets but maintains indivisible labor and heterogeneity through idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shocks. The equilibrium of this economy can be replicated by an allocation made
by a social planner who maximizes the equally weighted utility of the population. For an ef-
ficient allocation, the planner assigns workers with higher productivity to work. If a worker’s
productivity is above x∗t , he supplies h¯ hours of labor. The planner’s value function in the
complete market, denoted by V C(K,λ), and the decision rules for aggregate consumption,
C(K,λ), and cut-off productivity, x∗(K,λ), satisfy the following Bellman equation:
V C(K,λ) = max
C,x∗
{
lnC −B h¯
1+γ
1 + γ
∫ ∞
x∗
φ(x)dx+ βE
[
V C(K ′, λ′)
∣∣λ]}
subject to
K ′ = F (K,L, λ) + (1− δ)K − C,
where L = h¯
∫∞
x∗ xφ(x)dx is the aggregate effective unit of labor, and φ(x) is the cross-
sectional productivity distribution of workers (unconditional distribution of pix(x
′|x)). The
cut-off productivity x∗ satisfies:
(1)
1
C
FL(K,L, λ)h¯x
∗ = B
h¯1+γ
1 + γ
.
The left-hand side is the utility gain from assigning the marginal worker to production. The
marginal worker supplies h¯x∗ units of effective labor, and the marginal product of labor is
21
FL. The right-hand side represents the disutility incurred by this worker. The upshot is
that, under complete capital markets, there is a well-defined efficiency condition for labor
supply and consumption at the aggregate level.
GMM estimates from the model-generated aggregate data Except for β and ψ,
the same parameter values are used across all models. For the “indivisible-labor” model, β
is set to 0.99 and ψ is chosen to be consistent with 60% employment along with h¯ = 1/3. For
the “incomplete-markets” model, β and ψ are jointly searched to be consistent with average
hours of 0.2 (= 60% × 1/3) and an interest rate of 1% in a steady state. These economies
are simulated by the same aggregate productivity shocks.
Table 8 shows the parameter estimates from the aggregate time series of the “incomplete-
markets” (with divisible labor) model. Despite incomplete capital markets, the aggregate
data fairly accurately reveal the individual preference parameters with a high statistical
precision. With a large sample size, σ is 1.058 (0.024), 0.828 (0.072), and 0.855 (0.893),
according to (S), (EC), and (System), respectively. The labor supply parameter also reveals
the value assumed at the individual household level. With a large sample, γ is 2.588 (0.095),
2.828 (0.258), and 2.625 (0.148), according to (S), (EL), and (System), respectively. Figure
3 shows that the estimates are also highly concentrated around their means. The capital-
market incompleteness alone does not generate a large aggregation error because, with a
divisible labor supply, in response to aggregate productivity shocks, hours and consumption
are highly correlated across households, allowing for a fairly precise aggregation. To illustrate
this, we provide a simple example in Section III.D below.
According to Table 9, aggregate consumption from the “indivisible-labor” (with complete
capital markets) economy reveals the relative risk aversion of individual households. The
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estimate of σ is 0.963 (0.101) and 1.011 (0.064), according to (EC) and (System) with a large
sample size.11 The labor supply elasticity at the aggregate level is, however, very different
from that of households. The estimates of γ are 0.840 (0.096) and 0.793 (0.065), respectively,
for (EL) and (System) with a large sample size, implying a labor supply elasticity of 1.19
and 1.26, higher than the individual elasticity of 0.4. While aggregate preferences are not
necessarily identical to individual preferences, the GMM estimates based on the model-
generated aggregate time series reveal the social planner’s objective function, the (equally)
weighted average of household utility functions—there is a well-defined efficiency condition
under complete capital markets. Figure 4 confirms that the distributions of parameter
estimates are concentrated around their means.
We have shown that when individual optimality conditions are hard to aggregate (due
to incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor), an attempt to account for the aggre-
gate time series by an optimizing behavior of the representative household often ends up
with non-sensible estimates for preferences. MRS interpreted the non-sensible preference
parameters estimated from the aggregate time series as evidence of the failure of market
clearing. Our analysis suggests that the incompatibility between the equilibrium outcome of
a representative household’s optimization and the aggregate data may actually reflect poor
aggregation rather than the failure of the market—equilibrium outcomes of a heterogeneous-
agent economy cannot be easily represented by a stand-in household.
11Note that we do not estimate the static first order condition (S) for this model economy because it
holds exactly in (1). Potentially, the estimation of (S) is still possible because aggregate hours and wages
are subject to the so-called compositional bias. However, the composition bias does not a have enough
time-varying component as the economy moves near the deterministic steady state.
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D. An Illustrative Example
In this subsection, we illustrate why it is so difficult to aggregate individual optimality con-
ditions when both frictions—incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor—are present.
To make the analysis simple, we construct an example in a static environment. We also
abstract from the idiosyncratic productivity (x). Suppose a worker maximizes the utility,
c1−σ−1
1−σ −ψ h
1+γ
1+γ
, given the budget constraint, c = wh+ra. When the labor supply is divisible,
the optimality condition for the choice of hours worked and consumption is
(2) h(a) =
(
w
ψ · c(a)σ
) 1
γ
.
Suppose the cross-sectional distribution of individuals’ asset holdings is denoted by ξ(a).
Aggregating (2) for all workers yields:
(3) H =
(
w
ψ · Cσ
) 1
γ
·
∫ (
c(a)
C
)−σ
γ
dξ(a)
where H and C are aggregate hours and consumption. Equation (3) is almost identical
to the individual optimality condition (2) except for the last term. Rearranging (3) we
obtain an aggregate relation similar to the static first-order condition—Equation (S)—in a
representative-agent model:
(4)
ψHr
C−σ
= w
(∫
c(a)
−σ
γ dξ(a)
)γ
C−σ
The last term χ =
(∫
c(a)
−σ
γ dξ(a)
)γ
C−σ reflects the ratio of the CES aggregate of the marginal
utility of individual consumption to the marginal utility of aggregate consumption. For a
representative-agent model, χ = 1 as the distribution of asset holdings, ξ(a), is degenerate.
When aggregate disturbances are introduced in a dynamic model, this ratio χ is time-varying
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because aggregate consumption as well as the distribution, ξ(a), changes over time. Accord-
ing to the business-cycle accounting adopted by Hall (1997) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007), the variation of χ will show up as a time-varying wedge between the marginal rate
of substitution and the real wage. According to our simulation of the “incomplete-markets”
(with divisible-labor) model, the variation of this wedge is quantitatively small (the standard
deviation of the wedge relative to that of output is only 0.09). With a divisible labor supply,
all households’ consumption tends to move together in response to aggregate productivity
shocks, leaving the ratio χ (the ratio of CES aggregate of the marginal utility of individual
consumption to the marginal utility of aggregation consumption) virtually unaffected. Thus,
the estimation of (3) fairly accurately reveals the true preference parameters in (2).
When the labor supply is indivisible, however, this approximate aggregation of the in-
dividual worker’s intra-temporal optimality condition is not possible because that condition
holds with inequality. Specifically, in the static environment we just described, an individual
worker decides to work (h = h¯) if
(5) ∆U(a) =
ce(a)
1−σ
1− σ −
cu(a)
1−σ
1− σ ≥ ψ
h¯1+γ
1 + γ
where ce(a) = wh¯ + ra and cu(a) = ra denote consumption when the worker is working
(employed) and not working (unemployed), respectively. The left-hand side, ∆U(a), reflects
the additional utility of consumption from earnings and the right-hand side the disutility
from working. Given the strict concavity and continuity of the utility function, there exists
a unique reservation asset holdings, aR, below which workers supply h¯ hours. In addition,
thanks to the strictly decreasing marginal utility of consumption, ∆U(a) = w · h¯ · c˜(a)−σ
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where cu(a) < c˜(a) < ce(a) (mean-value theorem). Then, we can express Equation (5) as:
(6) h¯ ≤
(
w
ψ˜ · c˜(a)σ
) 1
γ
for a ≤ aR.
where ψ˜ = ψ
1+γ
. Aggregating (6) for labor-market participants (a < aR) yields:
(7) H ≤
(
w
ψ˜ · Cσ
) 1
γ
∫ a≤aR
[
c˜(a)
C
]
−σ
γ dξ(a)
Equation (7) shows the difficulties in deriving a meaningful aggregate relation when the
labor supply is indivisible. First of all, the inequality at the individual level carries over
to the aggregate level. Second, when aggregate disturbances are introduced in a dynamic
model, the reservation asset level (aR) for labor-market participation itself is time varying.
Third, the ratio of the CES aggregate of the marginal utility of consumption of participants
to the marginal utility of aggregate consumption (
∫ a≤aR
[ c˜(a)
C
]
−σ
γ dξ(a)) is more likely to move
because the aggregate productivity shock has a bigger impact on those who participate the
labor market. Moreover, it is not obvious how to measure c˜(a) in practice. To summarize,
when the labor supply is indivisible, individual optimality condition holds with inequality
and the aggregation of those inequalities does not necessarily yield a meaningful relation in
terms of observable aggregate variables. When the capital markets are complete, however,
despite the indivisible labor supply, there is a well-defined aggregate efficiency condition
(recall Equation (1) in Section III.C).
Finally, we note that the difficulty in aggregating individual optimality conditions is dis-
tinctly different from the “bounded rationality” (often refereed to as approximate aggrega-
tion) in Krusell and Smith (1998). The bounded rationality refers to the class of equilibrium
where agents’ information set is limited. In a heterogeneous-agent model with incomplete
capital markets, the equilibrium depends on the entire distribution of assets. In practice,
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it is impossible to include the entire distribution, an infinite-dimensional object, as a state
variable. Krusell and Smith show that, in a certain class of models, using limited informa-
tion about the distribution (i.e., the first moment only) is almost as good as using all the
information when predicting prices.12 For example, agents make their labor-supply decisions
(i.e., Equation (5)), using the forecasted wages based on aggregate productivity and capital
only. Yet, they seldom regret their decisions because the realized wages are almost identical
to their forecasts.13 Two aspects of the model allows for a successful forecasting of prices by
the first moment only. First, given the Cobb-Douglas aggregate production technology, the
equilibrium prices (marginal products) depends on the first moment only (e.g., aggregate
capital). Second, agents try to stay away from the borrowing constraint around which their
decision rules are highly non-linear. On the other hand, the real difficulty of deriving a
meaningful aggregating relations lies in the fact that the labor-market participation condi-
tion holds with inequality in (6) which will be true even under the perfect foresight about
the aggregate state.
IV. Summary
The cyclical behavior of aggregate hours worked, wages, and consumption is hard to reconcile
with the equilibrium outcome of the representative-agent model with standard preferences.
Attempts to estimate preferences based on optimality conditions of a stand-in household
often fail to deliver economically meaningful estimates. Either a commodity or leisure has to
12See Krusell and Smith (2006) for various applications of this method.
13In our benchmark-model simulation, the forecasting function of equilibrium prices (w and r) yields R2
of 0.997 and 0.988, respectively. See Appendix C in Chang and Kim (2007) for the accuracy of forecasting
functions of prices for the benchmark model.
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be an inferior good for the observed allocation to be an optimum. Unreasonable estimates
of preference parameters are interpreted as evidence that the economy operates outside the
labor-supply schedule in the short run due to, say, sticky wages. We demonstrate that this
incompatibility between the equilibrium of a representative-agent model and the aggregate
data can reflect a failure of aggregation rather than that of the market, suggesting that
outcomes of a heterogeneous-agent economy are not readily represented by an optimum of
a representative-agent model with stable preferences.
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Table 1: Parameter estimates based on U.S. data (Non-durables & Services)
Equations (S) (EC) (EL) System
Instrument I
σ 0.210 −0.210 −0.046
(0.062) (0.330) (0.027)
γ −0.569 0.179 0.023
(0.198) (0.145) (0.044)
β 0.994 0.997 0.996
(0.002) (0.0008) (0.0004)
ψ 0.156 0.113
(0.017) (0.011)
J-statistic 14.368 14.985 14.400 14.493
p-value 0.026 0.036 0.045 0.186
Instrument II
σ 0.188 −0.129 −0.040
(0.067) (0.308) (0.024)
γ −0.473 0.089 0.0006
(0.210) (0.122) (0.035)
β 0.995 0.997 0.996
(0.002) (0.0008) (0.0004)
ψ 0.164 0.112
(0.017) (0.011)
J-statistic 15.710 14.793 14.987 15.083
p-value 0.015 0.039 0.036 0.208
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Table 2: Parameter estimates based on U.S. data (Non-durables)
Equations (S) (EC) (EL) System
Instrument I
σ 0.834 0.243 0.589
(0.045) (0.381) (0.034)
γ −0.444 0.379 0.074
(0.108) (0.152) (0.058)
β 0.996 0.997 0.996
(0.002) (0.0008) (0.0006)
ψ 9.790 5.110
(1.336) (0.716)
J-statistic 6.048 11.664 12.229 12.308
p-value 0.418 0.112 0.093 0.422
Instrument II
σ 0.843 0.136 0.624
(0.049) (0.333) (0.029)
γ −0.450 0.413 0.018
(0.115) (0.138) (0.050)
β 0.996 0.996 0.996
(0.001) (0.0008) (0.0005)
ψ 10.189 5.765
(1.470) (0.710)
J-statistic 5.203 12.957 13.570 13.657
p-value 0.518 0.073 0.059 0.418
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Table 3: Parameters of the benchmark model economy
Parameter Description
α = 0.64 Labor share in production function
β = 0.9785504 Discount factor
σ = 1 Inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption
γ = 2.5 Inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity of leisure
ψ = 151.28 Utility parameter
h = 1/3 Labor supply if working
a¯ = −2.0 Borrowing constraint
ρx = 0.939 Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shock
σx = 0.287 Standard deviation of innovation to idiosyncratic productivity
ρλ = 0.95 Persistence of aggregate productivity shock
σλ = 0.007 Standard deviation of innovation to aggregate productivity
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Table 4: Characteristics of Wealth Distribution
Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total
PSID
Share of wealth -.52 .50 5.06 18.74 76.22 100
Group average/population average -.02 .03 .25 .93 3.81 1
Share of earnings 7.51 11.31 18.72 24.21 38.23 100
Benchmark Model
Share of wealth -2.05 2.46 10.22 23.88 65.49 100
Group average/population average -.10 .12 .51 1.19 3.27 1
Share of earnings 9.70 15.06 19.01 23.59 32.63 100
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Table 5: Cyclical property of aggregate variables: benchmark model
Variable U.S. Data Model
σY 2.04% 1.28%
σC/σY 0.43 0.39
σH/σY 0.85 0.76
σW/σY 0.56 0.50
cor(Y,C) 0.83 0.84
cor(Y,H) 0.87 0.87
cor(Y,W ) 0.60 0.68
cor(H,W ) 0.39 0.23
Note: All variables are logged and de-trended by the HP filter. The volatility of output is measured
by its standard deviation and that of all other variables is measured by the standard deviations
relative to output.
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Table 6: Parameter estimates : representative-agent model
Equations (EC) (EL) System
Small Sample Size:
σ 0.670 0.754
(0.197) (0.198)
γ 3.227 3.019
(0.252) (0.239)
β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Size 0.170 0.084
Large Sample Size:
σ 0.929 1.008
(0.093) (0.070)
γ 2.800 2.651
(0.197) (0.137)
β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Size 0.129 0.049
Note: For upper (lower) panel, means and standard errors are calculated from 2484 (618) estima-
tions. Each estimation has a sample size of 160 (640) observations. “Size” represents the empirical
size (fraction of estimates rejected) of J-test with nominal size of 5%.
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Table 7: Parameter estimates: heterogeneous-agent model
Equations (S) (EC) (EL) System
Small Sample Size:
σ 1.116 0.422 1.107
(0.079) (0.220) (0.064)
γ −0.065 −0.158 0.002
(0.160) (0.143) (0.101)
β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Large Sample Size:
σ 1.116 0.639 1.095
(0.034) (0.127) (0.023)
γ −0.139 −0.235 −0.013
(0.075) (0.064) (0.051)
β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Note: For upper (lower) panel, means and standard errors are calculated from 2484 (618) estima-
tions. Each estimation has a sample size of 160 (640) observations.
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Table 8: Parameter estimates: “incomplete-markets” model
Equations (S) (EC) (EL) System
Small Sample Size:
σ 1.057 0.578 0.936
(0.050) (0.181) (0.885)
γ 2.587 3.310 2.657
(0.162) (0.370) (0.271)
β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Large Sample Size:
σ 1.058 0.828 0.855
(0.024) (0.072) (0.893)
γ 2.588 2.828 2.625
(0.095) (0.258) (0.148)
β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Note: For upper (lower) panel, means and standard errors are calculated from 2484 (618) estima-
tions. Each estimation has a sample size of 160 (640) observations.
40
Table 9: Parameter estimates: “Indivisible-labor” model
Equations (EC) (EL) System
Small Sample Size:
σ 0.672 0.742
(0.209) (0.201)
γ 1.057 0.964
(0.121) (0.114)
β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Large Sample Size:
σ 0.963 1.011
(0.101) (0.064)
γ 0.840 0.793
(0.096) (0.065)
β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Note: For upper (lower) panel, means and standard errors are calculated from 2484 (618) estima-
tions. Each estimation has a sample size of 160 (640) observations.
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Figure 1: Kernel density of parameter estimates: representative-agent model
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Note: The density of parameter estimates are calculated by the kernel method (Gaussian kernel
with automatic bandwidth). The solid line represents the small-sample-size estimates (160 obser-
vations for each estimation), while the dashed line describes the large-sample-size estimates (640
observations for each estimation). The vertical dotted lines in the bottom panels represent 5%
critical values of the J-statistic.
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Figure 2: Kernel density of parameter estimates: heterogeneous-agent model
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Note: The density of parameter estimates are calculated by the kernel method (Gaussian kernel
with automatic bandwidth). The solid line represents the small-sample-size estimates (160 obser-
vations for each estimation), while the dashed line describes the large-sample-size estimates (640
observations for each estimation). The vertical dotted lines in the bottom panels represent 5%
critical values of the J-statistic.
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Figure 3: Kernel density of parameter estimates: “incomplete-markets”
model
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Note: The density of parameter estimates are calculated by the kernel method (Gaussian kernel
with automatic bandwidth). The solid line represents the small-sample-size estimates (160 obser-
vations for each estimation), while the dashed line describes the large-sample-size estimates (640
observations for each estimation). The vertical dotted lines in the bottom panels represent 5%
critical values of the J-statistic.
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Figure 4: Kernel density of parameter estimates: “indivisible-labor” model
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Note: The density of parameter estimates are calculated by the kernel method (Gaussian kernel
with automatic bandwidth). The solid line represents the small-sample-size estimates (160 obser-
vations for each estimation), while the dashed line describes the large-sample-size estimates (640
observations for each estimation). The vertical dotted lines in the bottom panels represent 5%
critical values of the J-statistic.
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